Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen
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The essays in this volume were written to celebrate the sixtieth birthday of G. E. L. Owen, who by his essays and seminars on ancient Greek philosophy has made a contribution to its study that is second to none. The authors, from both sides of the Atlantic, include not only scholars whose main research interests lie in Greek philosophy, but others best known for their work in general philosophy. All are pupils or younger colleagues of Professor Owen who are indebted to his practice of philosophical scholarship as a first-order philosophical activity. At the heart of G. E. L. Owen's work has been a preoccupation with the role of philosophical reflection on language in the metaphysics and epistemology of Plato, Aristotle and other ancient Greek thinkers. This is accordingly the general topic of the present volume, which includes five papers on Plato's critical dialogues and seven on Aristotle, prefaced by two on Heraclitus and followed by a study of the debate in Hellenistic philosophy on the sorites. This is a book for specialists in Greek philosophy and philosophers of language which will also be of interest to some linguists.
motion of the heavens. If he will attend then, just as the Delphian Apollo 'neither speaks nor conceals but makes a sign', these phenomena can exemplify for him the whole nature of things. He must lay himself open to such eminent instances. Now it is only by a transaction between things and minds, or designata and their designations held together by a practice, that language itself, not excluding vulgar prephilosophical language, has come into being and been invested with sense, reference and
issue of correctness of names, it is the naturalist position which excites his philosophical imagination and calls forth his analytical powers. He has little to say on the philosophical analysis of the notion of convention: for which see D. K. Lewis, Convention, and J. Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour. The denouement of the Cratylus 79 but not necessarily to the thorough-going conventionalism of Hermogenes. For the sentence about numbers plainly assumes that Cratylus will stick by his insistence
a certain view of the basic opposites. This view can be summed up as the following two claims, (i) One can view these basic opposites as one would view heat and cold; i.e. without any regard of the different completions that form predicates out of these, (ii) Each of these pairs must apply to everything; there can be no neutral ground, and no category-theory according to which some might apply to certain entities. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to see to what extent this view of the
particulars. But AR licenses forms only over groups of suitably imperfect things; and as we have seen, only certain sorts of sensibles are suitably imperfect. If we have a group consisting of imperfect Fs and a perfect F, we have a case of i(c) nonhomonymy; and AR does not license a further form over this set. Since the form of F is not itself imperfect, no further form over it is necessary. In sum: AR separates the perfect from the imperfect and this avoids unrestricted (OM). If it avoids (OM),
which fire is nourished). If so, then Heraclitus must think that, whatever happens, no fire is ever lost in the cycle of transformations ('Beginning and end are shared in the circumference of a circle', B103). If everything else is to fire as goods are to gold, then that cannot help but mean that the total fire-value of fire, sea and earth Flux, fire and material persistence 15 (plus prester, plus whatever else) taken together is constant. Suppose then that we were to try to think of